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I.

INTRODUCTION

A long-standing central tenet of U.S. Patent Office doctrine is
"compact prosecution."l When a patent application is examined
substantively,2 the Patent Office examiner is instructed that the
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.S., cum laude,
Princeton University. J.D., Harvard Law SchooL The author would like to
thank his research assistant, Erienne Sutherell.
1 See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, New Examining Procedures, 781 OF}'. GAZ.
PAT. OFFICE 1, 1 (Aug. 7, 1962) (providing the first official recorded reference to
the implementation of Compact Prosecution); see also Implementation of the
Patent Cooperation Treaty, 43 Fed. Reg. 20465 (May 11, 1978); Rules of
Practice in Patent Cases; Reexamination Proceedings, 46 Fed. Reg. 29182 (l\'I:ay
29, 1981); Revision of Patent and Trademark Fees ConfIrmation, 47 Fed. Reg.
41276 (Sept. 17, 1982); Changes to Patent Practice and Procedure, 62 Fed. Reg.
53150 (Oct. 10, 1997); Changes to Implement the Cooperative Research and
Technology Enhancement Act of 2004,70 Fed. Reg. 1818-02 (Jan. 11,2005).
2 A
patent application undergoes preliminary examination almost
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review is to be "complete as to all matters,"3 and that "piecemeal
examination should be avoided."4
In theory, it is hard to fault this concept of compact
prosecution. Avoiding multiple actions on multiple grounds is
efficient for both the patent office and applicants, and should
lead to earlier disposition. The system made good sense when
adopted. However, there have been significant changes to the
patent landscape in the ensuing years.
In the current environment, the theoretical efficiency and
speed offered by compact prosecution face challenges resulting
from the dramatic increase in the number of patent applications
being filed,5 the factual reality of long delays before a patent
application reaches the stage of first substantive evaluation (the
point at which compact prosecution takes place),6 the increased
importance of early application filing dictated by the transition to
a first·to-file system,7 and developments in the Supreme Court's
evolving definition of patentable subject matter.S Combined,
immediately, to assure that the application is complete (e.g., that there are no
missing pages), contains the necessary identifying information and is
accompanied by the required fees. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 1.53 (2014) (stating
the initial filing requirements for a patent application). Substantive
examination - evaluation of whether the application claims an invention that is
statutory subject matter which is novel, non-obvious and enabled; typically does
not take place until a year and a half (or more) later.
3 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(b).
4 MPEP § 707.07(g) (9th ed., Mar. 2014).
5 See U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963 - 2018, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., http;//www_uspto.gov/go/taflus_stat.htm (last updated July
24,2014) (indicating a steady increase in U.S. patent applications).
6 See Anthony C. Tridico, Ph.D. et al., USP'l'O Backlog Impacts Biopharma
Industry, GENETIC ENG'G & BIOTJ<;CHNOLOGY NEWS, Sept. 1, 2008, available at
http://www.martindale_com/matter/asr-977198.pdf ("[TJhe U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) is currently overwhelmed by a backlog of hundreds
of thousands of patent applications, which delays pat.ent examination and
is suance.").
7 See John Villasenor, March 16, 2013; The United States Transitions To A
'First-Inventor-To File' Patent System, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2013, 11:54 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/john villa senor/20 13103/111march -16-20 13-americatransitions-to-a -first-inventor-to-file- patent-systeml (explaining that the U. S.
first-to-file system requires inventors to take "prompt action to protect his or
her invention" or risk losing the patents rights to a later inventor).
8 See John V. Biernacki et aI., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank: Did the Supreme
Court Sign the Warrant for the "Death of Hundreds of Thousands of Patents'7,
JONES DAY (June 2014), http://www.jonesday.comJAlice-Corp-v-CLS-Bank-Didthe- Su preme-Court-Sign -the-Warrant- for- the· Dea th -of-Hundreds-of-Thousands
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these factors increase both the uncertainty of whether a claimed
invention is even patent-eligible and the time it takes for that
uncertainty to be reduced, thereby presenting a difficult and
unfair problem for innovators.9 Innovators must choose between
maintaining trade secrets in their innovations or seeking patent
protection, and must generally do so within eighteen months of
filing a patent application.lO Increasing the uncertainty of
availability of patent protection and delaying the time when that
uncertainty is reduced beyond the critical eighteen month period
makes patent protection a less attractive option. Innovators may
therefore be motivated to choose trade secrecy in preference to an
increasingly uncertain prospect of patent protection, an outcome
that is contrary to the constitutional goal of promoting progress.
A reevaluation of the central principle of compact prosecution
in light of current law and conditions suggests modifying the
system to allow patent applicants to opt out.
II. THE THEORY OF COMPACT PROSECUTION
In considering whether to issue a patent, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) examines the application to determine
whether it discloses and claims an invention that meets the
statutory criteria: l l principally, that the claimed invention is
patentable subject matter,12 that it is novel,13 that it is nonobvious,14 and that it is adequately described in the application. 15
If a claim fails any of the statutory criteria, it should be
rejected. Therefore, viewed solely from the perspective of
minimizing short-term workload, an examiner could reject the
·of·Patents·06·20·2014/?RSS=true (discussing the important U.S. Supreme
Court's decisions regarding patentable subject matter).
9 See Max Stul Oppenheimer, The innovator's Dilemma, 4 AM. u. Bus. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2015) (providing a more detailed discussion of the problem
facing innovators).
10 See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2012) ("[E]ach application for a patent shall
be published ... promptly after the expiration of a period of 18 months from the
earliest filing date.").
11 [d. § 131.
12 id. § 101.
13 Id. § 102.
14 Id. § 103.
15 Id. § 112(a). The statute requires that the application contain a written
description in sufficient detail to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make
and use the invention. Id. The statute further requires that the application
contain drawings, if necessary to understand the invention.id. § 113.
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claim immediately upon finding any ground for rejection. 16
However, viewed from the perspective of the applicant, this type
of piecemeal examination has several disadvantages. It
complicates the process and results in higher costs in terms of
time and legal fees, and it also delays the ultimate disposition of
the application by setting up sequential arguments over various
grounds of rejection. 17
Current PTO policy calls for "compact prosecution:"18
identification of all issues related to patentability in the first
substantive response to the applicant. l9 The Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (MPEP) cautions against "piecemeal
prosecution:"20
Piecemeal examination should be avoided as much as possible. The
examiner ordinarily should reject each claim on all valid grounds
available .... Rejections on grounds such as lack of proper
disclosure, lack of enablement, indefiniteness and res judicata
should be applied where appropriate even though there may be a
seemingly sufficient rejection on the basis of prior art.21

The logic of compact prosecution is simple and compelling: once
an application is taken up by an examiner, the examination
should be complete. This avoids forcing an examiner to "relearn"
an application multiple times,22 and it gives the applicant as
16 The applicant has the opportunity to argue for a reversal of the examiner's
position and, if successful, would compel the examiner to look for other
instances of non-compliance and thereby negate some of the efficiency. See 37
C_F_R. § 1.111 (2014) (permitting an applicant to reply to, and request
reconsideration of, the examiner's position).
17 See id. § 1.112 (allowing an applicant to request subsequent reexamination
of his or her claim before any rejection becomes final); see also MPEP § 710 (9th
ed., Mar. 2014) (discussing the relevant statutory period for requesting
reexamination of a patent application).
18 MPEP § 706.03.
19 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(b) ("The examiner's action will be complete as to all
matters, except that in appropriate circumstances, such as misjoinder of
invention, fundamental defects in the application, and the like, the action of the
examiner may be limited to such matters before further action is made.").
20 The PTO distinguishes between "compact prosecution" and "piecemeal
prosecution." The term "piecemeal" is pejorative_ As this article argues that
compact prosecution is flawed and should be replaced, it will use the term
"staged prosecution" in place of "piecemeal prosecution." As discussed later, the
PTO already deviates from compact prosecution in certain cases and views
these deviations as efficient and desirable. See discussion infra Part V.A.
21 MPEP § 707.07(g).
22 Applicants are generally allowed at least six months to reply to an
examiner's action regarding an application. See 35 U.S.C. § 133 (Supp. 2013)
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complete a picture as possible of the hurdles, if any, to
patentability. There is, however, a tradeoff. Because compact
prosecution requires more work than piecemeal examination, it
delays the time from filing until an application is taken up for
examination. Given the current system of pre-grant publication,23
the pressures of a first-to-file system,24 and the uncertainty as to
the scope of statutory subject matter,25 this delay is problematic.
Compact prosecution is too good an idea to abandon. However,
changes can be made to ameliorate its disadvantages.

III. THE FuNDAMENTAL BARGAIN
All inventions start as trade secrets.
Secrets Act defines a trade secret as:

The Uniform Trade

[T]nformation ... that: (i) derives independent economic value,
actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not
being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the

("Upon failure of the applicant to prosecute the application within six months
after any action therein ... or within such shorter time. .. as fixed by the
Director in such action, the application shall be regarded as abandoned."). The
PTO usually sets an administrative deadline of less than six months, but its
administrative rules provide that such deadlines can be extended up to the
statutory six months by paying late fees. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(1) (2014) ("If an
applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time
period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the
expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time
period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in
§ 1.17(a) are filed."); MPEP § 710.02(e) (stating the same). An examiner will
typically review a hundred other applications (depending on the art unit) in
that time.
23 Prior to 1999, patent applications were maintained in secrecy until issued
as patents. See Joseph M. Barich, Pre-Issuance Publication of Pending Patent
Applications: Not So Secret Anymore, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'y 415, 416 (2001).
Under that system, the problem of pendency did not arise. [d. In 1999, the
Patent Statute was amended by the American Inventors Protection Act to
provide for publication of most patent applications eighteen months after their
initial filing date, whether the application had been allowed as a patent or not.
See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. lO6-113, § lOOO(a) (9),
113 Stat. 1501 (1999) (enacting into law S. 1948, 306th Congo § 4503(b)(1)
(1999». In general, patent applications are treated as confidential by the PTO
until the eighteen-month publication date (or until the application is issued as a
patent if the applicant certifies that international applications will not be filed).
35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A)-(B).
24 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
25 See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.26

Thus, until the inventor discloses the invention to someone
else, it meets the definition of a trade secret. A trade secret lasts
as long as the definitional requirements are met;27 it has the
theoretical potential to be a perpetual right. Publication of a
patent destroys any trade secrets contained in the application by
making them generally known. 28 The inventor therefore must
make a choice: keep the trade secret (perhaps forever) or give it
up in exchange for a patent. 29
The owner of a trade secret can prevent misappropriation,
which is generally defined as disclosure or use of a trade secret
which has been obtained from the owner by improper means,:~o
while the owner of a patent can prevent infringement, which is
generally defined as the manufacture, use, sale or importation of
a product incorporating a patented invention for a period starting
on the date the patent is issued and ending twenty years after
the date the patent application was filed.3 1 Patent infringement
gives rise to damages, which are to be no less than a "reasonable
royalty,"32 and the possibility of an injunction33 and attorney fees
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985).
See David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret
Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 GONZ;. L. REV. 291, 304 (2010) ("[AJs long as the
definitional requirements are met, virtually any subject matter of information
can be a trade secret." (internal quotation marks omitted».
28 Max Stul Oppenheimer, Harmonization Through Condemnation: 1s New
London the Key to World Patent Harmony?, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNA'r'L L. 445, 447
nA (2007). Allowing publication would also destroy the trade secret as a failure
to make reasonable eU'orts to maintain its secrecy. ld.
29 More precisely, the exchange is for a possibility of a patent. See discussion
infra Part IV. It is this difference (possibility instead of certainty) that makes
the pendency problem important and justifies the argument in favor of staged
prosecution.
30 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(i).
31 35 U.s.C. § 154(a)(2) (Supp. 2013). The patent expires twenty years after
the date the earliest application was filed (i.e., if there are a series of related
patent applications, referred to as "continuing applications," the term is
measured from the date the first in the series was filed), and is subject to
adjustment in certain circumstances related to delays in processing by the PTO.
Id.
32 35 U.s.C. § 284 (2012). Although the statute specifies that damages be "no
less than a reasonable royalty," in practice damages rarely exceed what is
determined to be a reasonable royalty. See Third Wave Tech., Inc. v. Stratagene
Corp., 405 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1101 (W.D. Wis. 2005) (sating that under § 284,
courts "imagine a negotiation between the patentee and infringer taking place
2G

27
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in certain cases. 34
While enforcement of a trade secret turns on whether the
alleged infringer obtained the information from the trade secret
owner, enforcement of a patent does not.:~5 Thus, subsequent
independent discovery is a defense against trade secrets but not
against patents. B6 In addition, once a second party has
independently discovered the trade secret information, that party
is free to disclose it and thereby destroy the original trade secret
owner's rights;37 a patent is not invalidated by subsequent
independent discovery.38 The patent system therefore provides
at the moment the infringement began" which "is an approach that experts
have employed for decades in patenL cases").
3:~ The language of the statute regarding injunctions is permissive, not
mandatory: "Courts may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of
equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as
the court deems reasonable." 35 U.S.C. § 283. However, since a patent is, by
definition, unique, it might seem by analogy to real property law that
injunctions should always issue because damages would never provide a
complete remedy for iniringement. See id. § 102(a) (stating that a patented
invention must be novel). The Supreme Court has held, however, that even in
patent cases, a court must apply the traditional equitable four·factor test in
deciding whether it is appropriate to issue an injunction. See eBay, Inc., v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (discussing the four-factor tel:>t
a plaintiff must satisfy before a court may grant a permanent injunction).
34 35 U.s.C. § 285.
35 See Thomas W. Foley, Keeping A Company's Confidences Secret: Trade
Secret Enforcement Under iowa's Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 59 DRAKF: L. REV.
1, 12-13 (2010) (explaining that unlike patent law, the owner of a trade secret
cannot "prevent others from using public information to replicate his product").
~6 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575, 1585 n.24 (2003) (explaining that patent law tends to offer "more
protection than trade secret law because a patent forbids even independent
discover by a competitor"); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the
Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 206 (1987)
("[I]ndependent discovery is not a defense to a patent infringement suit,
although it is a defense to a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets.").
37 See Ari 13. Good, Trade Secrets and the New Realities of the Internet Age, 2
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 51, 63 (1998) ("[TJrade secret law does not prohibit
one from utilizing information which is discovered independently of the
[owner]."); see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984)
(stating that the public disclosure of a trade secret destroys the information's
status and thus deprives the trade secret's owner of a property interest).
a8 Under the fIrst-to-file system, a second inventor can destroy the first
inventor's right to a patent by disclosing the invention before the first inventor
discloses the invention (and files an application within a year from the
disclosure) or files a patent application. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). The first inventor
can minimize or eliminate this risk by filing promptly.
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motivation for holders of patent-eligible trade secrets to disclose
them (and therefore surrender protection under trade secret law)
in exchange for rights that are broader in scope but potentially
shorter in duration. A patent has a fixed, but guaranteed,
expiration date,39 while the term of a trade secret is uncertain
and depends on events beyond the owner's controJ.4°
A patent represents a bargain between the federal government
and an innovator, envisioned by the Constitution. 41 The
Constitution authorizes Congress to motivate scientific progress
by granting limited term monopolies to inventors.42 Congress
implemented this power early.43 This system promotes progress
by motivating innovators to give up trade secret protection in
exchange for a limited term, federal government protected,
monopoly on the innovation. 44 The patent laws are not "primarily
designed to provide a special private benefit .... [They are]
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and
inventors ... and to allow the public access to the products of
their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has
expired."45 However, in order to motivate that creative activity,
39 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (Supp. 2013) (stating that a patent's fixed
expiration date 1S suhject to the owner's payment of periodic maintenance fees).
40 See Vincent Chiappetta, Myth,
Chameleon or Intellectual Property
Olympian? A Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 69, 78 (1999) ("Trade secret protection theoretically can last
forever .... However, the holder constantly faces the uncertainty of sudden loss
of rights ... which can occur at any time through ... third party actions."); see
also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (amended 1985) (defining the term
"misappropriation" to include "improper means" taken by a third party in
acquiring or disclosing a trade secret).
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For a detailed analysis of how the clause was
adopted, see Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and
Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of
the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, :31-34 (1994).
42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cL 8.
43 The first patent statute was enacted in Congress' second session in 1790.
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793).
44 Note
that this particular exchange is Congress' invention - the
Constitution does not require disclosure of the invention in order to obtain the
exclusive rights conferred by a patent. The Constitution simply provides that
"The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8.
45 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
While Sony involved alleged infringement of copyrights, both copyright and
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the statute offers inventors several benefits;46 in return, the
public gets disclosure. 47
In theory, the disclosure required by the patent system
benefits society more broadly than trade secret protection
because broad disclosure provides the starting point for further
research to a larger pool of researchers. 4H

IV.

THE PENDENCY PROBLEM

The fundamental bargain-limited term monopoly in exchange
for disclosure of a trade secret-comports with standard contract
notions. 49 The owner of a trade secret is free to exchange that
patent laws are authorized by the same clause of the Constitution and the Sony
copyright analysis relies in part on patent precedents. See id. at 440-42
(discussing the "charge of contributory infringement" under patent law as it
applies to copyright law cases).
46 See, e.g., :35 U.S.C. § 154(d) (Supp. 2013) ("[A} patent shall include the
right to obtain a reasonable royalty from any person who ... makes, uses, offers
for sale, or sells in the United States the invention claimed in the published
patent application.").
47 Malla Pollack notes that there are multiple possible interpretations of
"progress" in Art. I, § 8, cl 8: "quality improvement in the knowledge base,
quantity improvement in the knowledge base (numerically), quantity
improvement in the knowledge base (judged economically), and spread
(distribution to the population)" but concludes that "[o]f these, quantity is the
least supportable. Quality has low support and creates problems in context.
Spread has the highest support." Malla Pollack, What is Congres8 Supposed to
Promote?: Defining "Progre8s" in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United
States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754,
756--57 (2001).
4S See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) ("When a
patent is granted and the information contained in it is circulated to the general
public and those especially skilled in the trade, such additions to the general
store of knowledge ... will stimulate ideas and the eventual development of
further significant advances in the art."); Peter Lee. Note, Patents, Paradigm
Shifts, and Progress in Biomedical Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659, 665 (2004)
(arguing that patent law promotes "hypothesis generation" and "advance[s]
fundamental scientific theory"); Lawrence D. Graham & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr.,
Economically Efficient Treatment of Computer Software: Reverse Enginerring,
Protection, and Disclosure, 22 RU1'. COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, 73 (1996)
("Theoretically, [public] disclosure of new ideas leads to further innovation. The
belief is that even though the public is prevented from interfering with
inventors' exclusive rights, tbe ability to study their inventions will lead to
more invention.").
49 See Fried. Krupp Aktien·Gesellschaft v. Midvale Steel Co., 191 F. 588, 594
(:3d Cir. 1911), cert. denied. 223 U.S. 728 (1912) ("[AJn American patent is a
written contract between an inventor and the government ... [that] c'Onsists of
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property for other property. 50 The fundamental bargain is
complicated, though, when the owner of the trade secret must
decide whether to surrender the trade secret in exchange for a
patent before the availability of the patent is assured. 51
For this reason, pendency becomes important. There are two
pendency periods of interest: "first action pendency" (the time
from the filing of a complete patent application until a patent
examiner substantively reviews the application and issues a first
action regarding patentability) and "disposition pendency" (the
time from filing until the application is disposed of, either by
allowance and issue as a patent or by abandonment).52 While the
PTO measures both,5~ and both are of interest to an applicant, 54
first action pendency is the applicant's first insight into how the
PTO views the application and therefore the applicant's first
opportunity to make an informed evaluation of the chances of
obtaining a patent. 55

mutual, interrelated considerations moving from each party to the other for the
such contract.").
50 Ct. ROGER A. MCCLAIN, REFRAMTNG ECONOMICS: ECONOMIC ACTION AS
IMPJ<;RF«;CT COOPERATION 23 (Edward Elgar Publ'g 2014) ("[1] is possible for trade
secrets to be legitimately bought and sold ...."). Interesting contract issues,
beyond the s(.'Ope of this article, arise where t.he trade secret owner is a minor.
See, e.g., In re Apple In·App Purchase Litig., 855 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1036 n.4
(N.D. Cal. 2012) ("A minor's lack of capacity to contract affects only the ability
of the other party to enforce the contract against the minor, not the minor's
ability to enforce the contract against the other party.").
51 See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 487 (explaining that "[t]he risk of eventual
patent invalidity" may cause some trade secret owners "not to take the trouble
to seck to ohtain ... patent protection. , . regardless of the existence of trade
secret protection").
52 See J. Michael Martinez de Andino & Gregory M. Murphy, US Patent
Office Delays Creating Limited and Late Protection, 19 No. 11 INTELL. PROP. &
TECH. L.J. 17, 17 (2007) (estimating that first action pendency takes roughly
22.6 months, while the entire period of disposition pendency is typically 31.1
months).
53 U.S. PA'T'ENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 14 (2014) [hereinafter USPTO REPORT FY 2013],
available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplanlar/USPI'OFY2013PAR. pdf.
54 See Request for Comments on Optimum First Action and Total Patent
Pendency, 79 Fed. Reg. 38,854 (July 9, 2014) (seeking input from the IP
community regarding "optimal patent first action and total pendency target
levels").
55 The inventor still faces uncertainty, as the first substantive action is
rarely the end of prosecution. The first action does, however, provide important
information indicating how the PTO views the application. In particular, under
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This evaluation is important because of the trade secret for
patent disclosure trade. Under pre-1999 law, the problem did not
arise. Patent applications were maintained in confidence until
the patent issued. 56 Under that system, at any point prior to
issuance of the patent, the applicant could withdraw the
application and its contents would remain secret. 57 Thus, there
was a bargain in the contract sense. The applicant traded a trade
secret for a patent and both parties knew exactly what they were
giving up and what they were getting. 58 In 1999, as part of an
international harmonization effort, 59 the statute was amended to
provide for publication of pending patent applications. nO Under
the new regime, the fundamental contract bargain could still be
maintained, if the PTO disposed of applications before
publication. 61 However, if the application has not even been
the current system, this is the earliest date on which the inventor will learn
whether the PTO perceives an issue regarding statutory subject matter. Of
course, there is still uncertainty even if the PTO sees no such issue, as the issue
can still be raised as a defense in an infringement action.
56 See Joseph M. Barich, Pre-Issuance Publication of Pending Patent
Applications: Not So Secret Any More, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'y 415, 416
(2001) (explaining that before 1999, "a patent application was kept in secrecy by
the PTO until the patent application issued as a patent").
57 See id. ("[I[f the inventor was not satisfied by the scope of the c1aims
offered by the PTO, the inventor was under no obligation to proceed with
prosecution of the patent application and the inventor suffered no loss of'
rights.").
58 Even an issued patent can be invalidated, and the Commissioner can
withdraw a patent (although that power is rarely exercised). 37 C.F.R. § 1.1313
(2014). Either of' these situations deprives the applicant of nothing if the
invalidation is based on prior art, but poses a problem if the invalidation is
based on qualification as statutory subject matter. See discussion infra Part
V.B.
.59 See generally John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law,
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 715-16 (2002) (providing a brief history regarding
the early publication of patent applications globally).
nO See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, Div.
B, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1501, 1536 (1999) (enacting the Intellectual Property
and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, S. 1948, 106th
Congo § 4502(a» (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 122 (Supp. 2013».
Generally, applications are published eighteen months after their priority date.
35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1) (Supp. 2013).
61 Disposition - i.e., either allowance of claims or final denial of the
application - would be ideal. A first substantive patent office evaluation of the
application prior to publication would at least give the applicant an indication
of the likelihood of obtaining patent protection before the irrevocable decision to
surrender trade secret protection had to be made.
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reviewed substantively at the time the applicant must make the
decision, the decision is more a lottery than a traditional
contractual bargain.
A. The Basic Bottleneck
The PTO faces a significantly different world today than it did
in 1999. In 1999, roughly 270,000 utility patent applications were
filed and just over 150,000 were issued as patents.. 62 In 2013 (the
latest year for which there is available data), nearly 575,000
applications were filed and more than 275,000 patents were
issued. 63 Expectations are that the transition to first-to-file under
the America Invents Act ("AlA") will result in even more
applications being filed, as nervous inventors are motivated to
file multiple applications on the same invention in order to
reduce the risk that an anticipatory prior art reference will be
created while the inventor is perfecting the invention. 64
While the PTO has made progress in the last five years, it has
been unable to provide a first substantive review of most patent
applications within eighteen months of their filing date, and the
average time to reach a final decision on patentability
approaches two and a half years. Go Assuming that two weeks
would be sufficient time for an inventor to receive a first
substantive action, evaluate it, make a decision whether to
continue with the application or abandon it, the average
pendency to first action would need to be reduced to 16.5 months
in order to allow time for a decision to abandon the application to
be communicated to the PTO in time to withdraw the application
G2 There were 270,187 applications filed and 153,485 issued. U.S. Patent
Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963 - 2013, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/us_stat.htm (last updated July 24, 2014). Of course,
the issued patents were unlikely to have been filed in the same year t.hey were
issued because of the time taken to examine an application. The numbers,
however, are representative. Between 1994 and 2004, applications ranged from
189,857 to 356,943 and issued patents ranged from 101,676 to 164,290 . ld.
63Id.
64 See Sean T. Carnathan, Patent Priority Disputes-A Proposed ReDefinition of "First-to-Invent," 49 ALA. L. REV. 755, 796 (1998) (explaining that
"the burden on the PTO will increase" under a first-to-file system due to "hasty
applications" with "limited experimental exemplification or support").
65 Average pendency to first action was 18.2 months and LO disposition 29.1
months in 2013. USPTO REPORT FY 2013, supra note 53, at 14. In 2008, the
average time to first action was 25.6 months and the average time to disposition
was 32.2 months. Id. at 16.
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from publication. 66

B. The First-lo-File Factor
The move from the historical first-to-invent system to a firstto-file system was debated for more than forty years before
adoption. fi7 During that debate, defenders of the historical system
worried about the impact of the change on the quality and
pendency of patent applications. 68 Under the historical first-toinvent system, the first inventor was entitled to a patent if an
application was filed within a year of the first public disclosure or
offer of sale of the invention. 69 Under a first-to-file system, if the
technology claimed in a patent application is already in the prior
art7° as of the date the application is filed, the application will be
rejccted.71 Critics of the first-to-file system were therefore
concerned that such a system would force inventors to file
multiple premature and sketchy disclosures for fear of losing out
to a later inventor who managed to draft an application more
66 An applicant can avoid publicatiun by filing an express abandonment of an
applicatiun. 37 C.F.R. § L138(c) (2014). However, "the Office cannot discontinue
the pre-grant publication process during the last two to four weeks of the
publication process." MPEP § 1120 (9th ed., Mar. 2014). It would therefore
appear that the PTO must receive notice of abandonment no later than (and
possibly earlier than) seventeen months from the effective application date.
67 The debate at the national level can be traced back at least to a 1966
recommendation by President Johnson's Commission on the Patent System.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. SENATE, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL

ARTS: REPORT OF THE PRESlDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, S. Doc.

NO.5, at 14----15 (1st Sess. 1967), available at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu
Icgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 10 1 O&context=historical. The move was also
supported in 1992 by the Clinton Administration. ADVISORY COMM. ON PATENT
LAw REJ<'ORM, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF COMM"ERCE 11 (1992), available at
http://ipmall.info/hosted]esources/lipa/patents/patentact/ACPLR-l. pdf; see also
Oppenheimer, supra note 28 at 462-70 (cataloguing the arguments for and
against the two systems).
68 Oppenheimer, supra note 28, at 468.
69 85 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
70 "Prior art" refers to information which is relevant to a determination of
patentability: information which was available to the public through a printed
publication, through public use, through an offer of sale, "or otherwise available
to the public," Id § 102(a)(I), expanded by the legal fiction that issued patents
and published patent applications are treated as though they were published on
their filing date, not the date on which the public gained access to them.
Id. § 102(a)(2).
71 Id. § 102(a). The prior art is also the basis for rejecting claims as "obvious."
Id. § 103.
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quickly.72 This, critics worried, would lead to an increased burden
on the PTa, which would need to respond either by lowering
examination quality or tolerating increased application
pendency.73 Former Patent Commissioner Banner noted that the
negative impact of the system would fall disproportionately on
inventors with limited resources. 74
On March 15, 2013, the debate ended and the first-to-file
system went into full effect. 75 While it is too soon for definitive
data, one commentator pointed to Japan as a first-to-file country
whose experience was predictive: over five times as many
applications are filed in Japan than in the United States and
many of the Japanese applications are "scraps of papers written
by the inventors and submitted for a priority date."76
U.S. standards would penalize such cursory applications
because the statute sets a higher standard of disclosure: one
sufficient to enable those of ordinary skill in the field to make
and use the invention. 77 If the United States continues to
maintain its standards of enablement, U.S. inventors face a
disadvantage since they are required to file their applications in
the U.S. 78 and the higher standards translate into longer time to
72 See, e.g., MAURICE H. KLITZMAN, PATENT INTERFERENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE
24 (1984) (noting that first· to-file would encourage a race to the patent office
with "hasty application drafting with limited experimental exemplification or
support"); Carnathan, supra note 64 at 796 (explaining that applicants may be
"forced to file continuation-in-part applications in increased numbers" under a
first-to-file system); Gregory J. Wrenn, What Should Be our Priority: Protection
for the Nrst to .File or the First to Invent?, 72 ,J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y
872, 885 (1990) (cautioning that "there are significant risks that result from
over-encouraging early filing").
73 See, e.g., Vito J. DeBari, Note, International Harmonization of Patent Law:
a Proposed Solution to the United States' First-to-/ile Debate, 16 FORDHAM INT'L
L. J. 687, 704 (1993) (suggesting that a first· to-file system would "resultD in a
decline in the quality of applications" and "an increased volume of patent
applications filed for defensive purposes").
74 See Donald W. Banner, Patent Law Harmonization, 1 U. BALT. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 9, 12 (1992) (stating that a first-to·file system "would aid the
multinational corporations but mortally injure the individual inventor and
small companies").
75 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284,
285-93 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U .S.C.).
76 Charles R. B. Macedo, Note, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the
International Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 543,573 n.155 (1988).
77 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
78 U.S. inventors are required to file III the United States and wait six
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prepare the application (and therefore a later priority date).
Therefore, a prudent U.S. inventor, unable to take advantage of
more relaxed filing requirements abroad, would need to file at
least two applications per invention: a minimum application to
protect against lower-standard foreign filings, and a fullyenabled application meeting U.S. standards. Thus, even if
inventive activity does not increase, it would be expected that
filings would. These additional filings would increase the burden
on the PTO and would be expected to increase pendency times.

C. The Definitional Dilemma
Adding even greater complexity, the Supreme Court's evolving
definition of patentable subject matter has made it harder to
predict patentability.79 Patents are only granted for certain types
of inventions, known as "statutory subject matter" and defined in
35 U.S.C. § 101 as machines, manufactures, compositions of
matter and processes. so The list of patentable subject matter,
though broad,81 is exclusive. 82
More than 150 years ago, the Supreme Court held that
Congress has "plenary" power to decide how to implement the
months before filing abroad, or to obtain a foreign filing license. Id. § 184(a).
79 There is always uncertainty in predicting patentability of an invention.
Under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, a patent will be denied if the claimed
invention was already known or is merely an obvious extension of what was
already known. Because it is impossible to fully characterize the prior art (some
of which may be contained in patent applications which have been pending less
than eighteen months and are therefore inaccessible), there is always an
element of uncertainty around a patentahility opinion. This is an unavoidable
aspect of the priority system, and one that is not even fully removed upon grant
of the patent. Even an issued patent is subject to invalidation based on prior art
that was not before the PTO during examination. However, the issue of
patentable subject matter is a different (and solvable) uncertainty. See
discussion infra Part V.C.
80 35 U.S.C. § 101.
81 The term manufacture is meant to include "anything under the sun that is
made by man." S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82·1923, at 6
(1952); see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (rejecting the
argument that a genetically engineered hacterium was implicitly excluded from
statutory subject matter because, although a "composition of matter," it was
alive).
82 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974) ("[N]o
patent is available for a discovery, however useful, novel, and nonohvious,
unless it falls within one of the express categories of patentable subject matter
of35 U.S.C. § 101.").
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Constitutional power to promote progress through the patent
system 83 and more recently the Court warned lower courts not to
read words into the patent statute. B4 This has not stopped the
Court itself from creating exceptions to the categories of
statutory subject matter that are established by the clear words
of the statute. 85
While the statutory language chosen by Congress is broad and
has remained largely unchanged since first enacted in 1790, the
Supreme Court has engrafted limitations on what otherwise
appears to be a clear statement of Congressional intent.
Moreover, the Court has revised its interpretation several times,
leaving researchers uncertain as to what can be protected (and
therefore what research might be justified economically).86
The statute authorizes four categories of statutory subject
matter,87 but the Supreme Court excludes from patent protection
"la ws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas"S8
because "[p)henomena of nature ... , mental processes, and
abstract intellectual concepts are ... the basic tools of scientific
and technological work."89 This matters, not only because the
Court's definition is narrower than the statute's, but more
importantly because the Court's definition is less predictable
than the statute's. The unpredictability of the Supreme Court's
definition is clearly shown by the difficulty the Federal Circuit
has had in applying it-in every statutory subject matter case
8B See McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202, 206 (1843) ("lTJhe powers of
Congress to legislate upon the subject of patents is plenary by the terms of the
Constitution, and ... there are no restraints on its exercise."); Evans v. Jordan,
13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 199, 204 (1815); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.)
539, 541~42 (1852); Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.s. (1 WalL) 340, 351 (1864);
Eunson v. Dodge, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 414,417 (1873).
!;4 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981).
85 Id. at 219; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972).
86 Max Stu! Oppenheimer, Patents 101: Patentable Subject Matter and
Separation of Powers, 15 VAND. J. EN'!'. & TECH. L. 1, 3 (2012).
87 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182.
88 Id. at 185 ("[LJaws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" are
unpatentable); Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 ("Phenomena of nature, though just
discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not
patentable as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.");
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) ("[PJart of
the storehouse of knowledge ... are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all
men and reserved exclusively to none.").
89 Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
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reaching the Supreme Court, it has reversed the Federal
Circuit. 90 In dealing with these reversals, the Federal Circuit has
noted the difficulty of fathoming the Supreme Court's
instructions. Its frustration is evident in passages such as:
The Supreme Court has not been clear ... as to whether such
subject matter is excluded from the scope of § 101 because it
represents laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.
The Supreme Court also has not been clear as to exactly what kind
of mathematical subject matter may not be patented. The Supreme
Court has used, among others, the terms "mathematical
algorithm," "mathematical formula," and "mathematical equation"
to describe types of mathematical subject matter not entitled to
patent protection standing alone. The Supreme Court has not set
forth, however, any consistent or clear explanation of what it
intended by such terms or how these terms are related, if at alL 91

Given this uncertainty at the nation's specialized patent court,
it is understandable that patent applicants would face difficulty
in evaluating this aspect of patentability of their inventions-and
therefore in evaluating the wisdom of surrendering trade secret
protection. This uncertainty as to property rights is a
disincentive for inventors to spend the time on fundamental
research and for investors to provide the necessary funding. 92
The clearest explanation of the theoretical underpinnings of
these judicial exclusions may be found in Justice Breyer's dissent
from the dismissal of certiorari in Laboratory Corporation of
America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. 93
The relevant principle of law "[e]xclude[s] from ... patent
protection ... laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas." ... The justification for the principle does not lie in any
claim that "laws of nature" are obvious, or that their discovery is
easy, or that they are not useful. To the contrary, research into
such matters may be costly and time consuming; monetary
incentives may matter; and the fruits of those incentives and that
research may prove of great benefit to the human race. Rather, the
reason for the exclusion is that sometimes too much patent
90 See generally Jeremy D. Raux, Note, The Supreme Court and § 101
Jurisprudence: Reconciling Subject·Matter Patentability Standards and the
Abstract Idea Exception, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 629, 633-41 (2014) (providing
historical background regarding the evolution of § 101 subject matter eligibility
as defined by the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court).
91 In re Allapat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1543 n.19 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
92 Oppenheimer, supra note 86 at 3.
93 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc. 548 U.S. 124, 125-39
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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protection can impede rather than "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts," the constitutional objective of patent and
copyright protection. 94
The problem arises from the fact that patents do not only
encourage research by providing monetary incentives for invention.
Sometimes their presence can discourage research by impeding the
free exchange of information .... 95
Thus, the Court has recognized that "[p]henomena of nature,
though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual
concepts are ... the basic tools of scientific and technological
work." It has treated fundamental scientific principles as "part of
the storehouse of knowledge" and manifestations of laws of nature
as "free to all men and reserved exclusively to none." And its doing
so reflects a basic judgment that protection in such cases, despite
its potentially positive incentive effects, would too often severely
interfere with, or discourage, development and the further spread
of useful knowledge itself. 96

As noted by Federal Circuit Judge Newman in 1994, "[t]he
boundary between patentable and unpatentable subject matter is
not always a bright line."97
Matters have not improved in the interim. The definition of
statutory subject matter has puzzled the Federal Circuit,98
commentators,99 and the PTO.loO The Supreme Court itself noted

[d. at 126-27 (internal and other citation omitted).
id. at 127.
96 Id. at 127-28 (internal citation omitted).
97 See in re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1543 n.19, 1569 ("The Supreme Court has
not been clear ... as to whether such subject matter is excluded from the scope
of' § 101 because it represents laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract
ideas .... Diehr ... viewed
mathematical
algorithm
as
a
law
of'
nature .... Benson . .. treated mathematical algorithm as an 'idea.' ... The
Supreme Court also has not been clear as to exactly what kind of mathematical
subject matter may not be patented. The Supreme Court has used, among
others, the terms 'mathematical algorithm,' 'mathematical formula,' and
'mathematical equation' to describe types of mathematical subject matter not
entitled to patent protection standing alone. The Supreme Court has not set
forth, however, any consistent or clear explanation of' what it intended by such
terms or how these terms are related, if at all.").
98 Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. at 125-39.
99 See Joshua Sarnoff, Patent·Eligible inventions after Bilski: History and
Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 55 (2011) (arguing that it is difficult to draw a
legal line regarding what is considered eligible subject matter under section 101
in the United States); Aaron J. Zakem, Note, Rethinking Patentable Subject
Matter: Are Statutory Categories Useful?, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2983, 2988 (2009)
("[Ilt has proven difficult to draw an exclusionary line which disallows
94

95
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that the "line between a patentable 'process' and an unpatentable
'principle' is not always clear."lOl The PTO and Federal Circuit, in
trying to implement the Supreme Court's evolving definition of
statutory subject matter, have announced, then abandoned (or
had overruled), a series of patentable subject matter rubrics: the
"technological arts" test;102 the "Freeman-WaIter-Abele" test;103
the "mental steps" test;104 the "mathematical algorithm" test;105

inhibitive patents without prejudicing claims on novel and non-obvious
technology."),
100 See infra notes 102-07 and accompanying text (describing the challenge
of identifying a consistent test),
101 Parker v. Flook. 437 U.S. 584.589 (1978).
102 See Tn re Musgrave, 431 F,2d 882, 893 (C,C.P.A. 1970) (announcing the
test), But see Gottschalk v, Benson, 409 U,S, 63, 71-72 (1972) (rejecting the
same).
103 Developed in three patent office decisions, the test essentially consisted of
first determining whether a mathematical algorithm was recited directly or
indirectly in the claim and, if so, next determining whether the claimed
invention as a whole is no more than the algorithm itself or is applied to or
limited by physical elements or process steps, In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 907
(C,C.PA 1982); In re Walter, 618 F,2d 758, 767 (C,C.P.A. 1980); In re Freeman,
573 F,2d 1237, 1245 (C,C,P.A. 1978); see AT&T Corp. v. Excel Comme'ns, Tnc.,
172 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (modifying the Freeman-WaIter·Abele Test
to no longer require physical elements).
104 See Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 893, 894 (''We cannot agree ... that tbese
claims ... are directed to non· statutory processes merely because some or all
the steps therein can also be carried out in or with the aid of the human mind
or because it may be necessary for one periormjng the processes to think.").
lOG Benson, 409 U.S. at 71 (1972) (finding that a claim to a method of
converting binary-coded decimal numbers into decimal numbers was not an
invention or discovery under § 101, even though the claimed method was to be
performed by a computer, since the method had no substantial practical
application other than with a digital computer); Flook, 437 U,S. at 585, 591,593
(holding that a claim to a method of updating "alarm limits" was not covered by
35 U.S.C. § 101 since it amounted to the discovery of a mathematical formula
which, although novel, does not constitute a discovery that the statute would
protect), Cf Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 178--79 (1981) (finding that a
claim to a process for operating a rubber·molding press was within § 101, even
though one element of the claim was the calculation of the appropriate time to
open the press), The Court distinguished Flook as not containing "any
disclosure relating to the chemical processes at work, the monitoring of process
variables, or the means of setting off an alarm or adjusting an alarm system"
and noted "excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas .. " Our recent holdings in Gottschalk v,
Benson. , . and Parker v. Flook, ... both of which are computer-related, stand
for no more than these long-established principles," Id. at 185, 187.

276

ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 25.2

the machine implemented test; lOG and the "transformation"
test. 107
The two industries most affected by the narrowing of the
statutory language are computer software and medical
technologylO8 - two of the most important industries in the U.S.
economy. 109 The early cases of Gottschalk v. Benson,l1o Parker v.
Flook,lll and Diamond v. Diehr 1l2 seemingly settled the question
for the computer industry, but Bilski v. Warsaw 1l3 and Alice
Corp. Ply. v. CLB Bank Int'1114 have reopened it. Most recently,
the Supreme Court has held that certain types of medical
treatment inventions, although within the meaning of "process"
are nevertheless excluded from the definition of "statutory
subject matter" and therefore cannot be patented because they
represent no more than observing a correlation between a
biological datum and a preferred method of treatment,ll!i and
that other types of inventions, although within the meaning of
"composition of matter" are nevertheless excluded from the
definition of "statutory subject matter" and therefore cannot be
patented because they represent no more than extracting

106 See In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 841 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (noting that the fact
that a nonstatutory method is carried out on a programmed computer does not
make the process claim statutory).
107 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010).
lOS Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank lnt'!, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014);
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1299 (2012).
109 See PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE ET. AL., FED. INC. TAX. INTELL. PROP. &
INTANGIBLE Ass. '1 7.01 (2015), available at 1998 WL 1038691 (describing the
importance of the computer software market to the global economy); see also
William W. George, Medical Technology and Competitivene8s in the World
Market: Reinventing the Environment for Innovation, 50 FOOD & DRUG L,J. 477,
477 (1995) (discussing the importance of' medical technology in the global
industry).
110 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
111 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
112 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
113 Sec Bilski v, Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 607, 609 (2010) (holding that the
concept of hedging risk and its application to energy markets were not methods
that were patentable as processes, but rather were unpatentable abstract
ideas).
114 See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'I , 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359 (201 4)
(holding that the claims were not patentable because they simply instructed the
practitioner to implement an abstract idea on a generic computer).
115 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1302
(2012).
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something which previously existed in nature.1l6
These cases, at a minimum, complicate the decision of whether
to seek patent protection for computer implementations or
medical discoveries in general. Complication and uncertainty
have two important consequences: they tend to favor trade
secrecy in two fields where trade secret protection is a viable
option,117 and they increase the cost of financing innovation in
two fields where innovation is economically important.11 8 For
example, while Congress would certainly have the power to
exclude medicine from the type of progress the nation wants to
encourage,119 it would be astonishing if it chose to do so, given the
recent emphasis on the importance of improving access to
medical care and cost containment and the hope that better data
management will help reach those goals.
V. THE CASE FOR STAGED PROSECUTION

A. Precedents

Even under the current compact prosecution system, there are

116 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117
(2012).
117 Computer programs can be maintained in secret while offering "Software
as a Service." See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Taxing Facebook
Code: Debugging the Tax Code and Software, 60 Bmy L. REV. 1, 51 (2012)
(discussing cloud computing and SaaS). Diagnostic test companies can maintain
processes and evaluation criteria in secret and insist that samples be sent to
them for analysis.
118 See George, supra note 109, at 477-78 (discussing the importance of
innovation to manufacturers in the world market).
119 Congress has done so in several areas. Nuclear weapons technology, tax
strategy patents and claims "directed to or encompassing a human organism"
are specifically excluded from patentability. See 42 U.s.C. § 2181(a) (2012) ("No
patent shall hereafter be granted for any invention or discovery which is useful
solely in the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy in an
atomic weapon."); see also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 11229, §§ 14(a), 33(a), 125 Stat. 284, 327, 340 (2011) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of' 35 U.S.C.) ("For purposes of evaluating an
invention ... any strategy for reducing, avoiding, or deferring tax liability,
whether known or unknown at the time of the invention or application for
patent, shall be deemed insufficient to differentiate a claimed invention from
the prior art .... [Additionally,] no patent may issue on a claim directed to or
encompassing a human organism."). Although theoretically patentable, medical
procedures are, in effect, not worth patenting as Congress has denied remedies
for infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c).
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some aspects of a patent application that are examined
separately and ahead of full substantive examination of the
merits of the application,120
Initially, even before according an application a filing date, it is
examined for compliance with certain requirements of the
statute. 121 These determinations-whether the application
appears to be complete, 122 whether it includes any required
drawings,12B whether it contains claims if a non-provisional
application,124 whether it identifies the inventor,125 and whether
the appropriate fees have been paid126~do not require knowledge
of the technology or the prior art, and are carried out by a crosstechnology branch of the PTO .127 Of particular relevance to the
120

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

121 There are two preliminary determinations made with respect to every
application. First, it is determined if the application is entitled to a filing date.
See 37 C.F.R. §§ L53(a), (b) (2014) ("Any papers received in the Patent and
Trademark Office which purport to be an application for a patent will be
assigned an application number for identification purposes .... The filing date
of an application for patent filed under this section ... is the date on which a
specification ... is received in the {Patent and Trademark] Office."). In
compliance with the provisions of the Hague Agreement Concerning
International Registration of Industrial Designs, the Patent Law Treaties
Implementation Act of 2012 the only requirement for establishing the filing
date for a Nonprovisional application is the filing of "a specification, with or
without claims." Id. § L53(b). If the application meets these requirements, it
receives a filing date and serial number even though there may be additional
elements required before the application is ready for examination on the merits.
ld. § 1.53(a); see also id. § 1.54(a) (allowing an application to be sent in parts).
An application may even receive a filing date if it only refers to and
incorporates by reference another pending application. See id. § 1.53(a) (stating
that all papers "received in the Patent and Trademark Office which purport to
be an application for a patent will be assigned an application number for
identification purpose."). If an application does not include the required fees, at
least one claim or the inventor's oath or declaration, the applicant is notified
and given a period of time within which to supply the missing elements (and
pay a surcharge). Id. § 1.53(£)(1). Only upon failure to respond within the
allowed time results is the application abandoned.ld.
122 See MPEP § 503 (9th ed. Mar. 2014) (describing the requisite pieces of a
patent application).
123Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 See 35 V.S.C. § 131 (2012) (mandating that the director cause patent
examiners to examine the patent application and the alleged new invention); see
also JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET. AL., 4 PAT. L. fuNDAMENTALS § 15:12 (2d ed.
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argument for separating out other aspects of prosecution, these
examinations are carried out quickly, typically within a month of
filing the application.
The current compact prosecution system also acknowledges
special circumstances where certain aspects of examination
should take place before others are addressed. 128 The MPEP lists
several examples of such circumstances:
(A) Where an application is too informal for a complete action on
the merits;129
(B) Where there is an undue multiplicity of claims; 130
(C) Where there is a misjoinder of inventions; 131 and
(D) Where disclosure is directed to perpetual motion. 132

These determinations do not relate to the specific technology
involved in the application, and do not require the timeconsuming process of determining the state of the art and
making determinations of novelty or obviousness. Conceptually,
they require legal rather than technological analysis.
A determination of qualification as statutory subject matter is
closely analogous to these types of determinations. It is an
essentially legal analysis, not related to the technology
involved. 133 It does not involve a search or evaluation of the prior
art or comparison of the claimed invention to the prior art.134 It
therefore does not need not be evaluated in the Art Units, but
rather could be centralized and dealt with as a preliminary
matter. It should therefore be both feasible and within the PTO's
authority to manage the prosecution process.!35
2015) (discussing the patent application review process in more detail).
121l See MPEP § 707.07(g) ("Some situations exist where examination of an
application appears best accomplished by limiting action on the claim thereof to
a particular issue.").
12!-J [d. (citing MPEP § 702.01).
130 [d. (citing MPEP § 2173.05(n».
131 [d. (citing MPEP §§ 803, 810, 812.01).
182 [d. (explaining that in this situation, examiners are instructed that "the
best prior art readily available should be cited and its pertinency pointed out
without specifically applying it to the claims").
133 See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
1:H See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
l35 It may well be that this preliminary determination will save costs by
terminating some applications at this stage. While the net cost or benefit to the
PTQ will not be known until the review has been implemented, this additional
review will certainly take time and therefore require additional personnel and
impose additional short-term cost on the PTO. In the model proposed below, two
aspects are introduced to take account of this uncertainty; giving the applicant
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B. Economic Justification
The most pressing need for staged prosecution relates to early
determinations of statutory subject matter qualification, and the
industries most in need of this relief are those involved in the
ongoing evolution of the Supreme Court's definition: biotech and
computer software. 13G Although written in the early days of the
biotech industry, Monsanto IP Counsel Byron Olsen's insights
remain valid today:
In many cases the availability of patent protection for corporations
engaging in biotechnology R&D is essential to their
survival ... [bJecause it generally takes so much investment to
develop and get approval for a new therapeutic .... Besides the
argument for enhanced industry security, allowing patent
protection would stimulate this and related business sectors by
creating jobs and contributing to a positive balance of trade that
the United States generally enjoys within the intellectual property
marketplace. 137

The cost of development of new therapeutics has risen
dramatically since those words were written in 19971~8 as has the
importance of the U.S. biotech industry.
Even while arguing that patent protection should not be
extended to the discovery of a basic biological relationship,
Justice Breyer noted:
The justification for the principle does not lie in any claim that

the option whether to request preliminary review of patentable subject matter
eligibilit.y, and giving the PTO the option to establish a unique process for
handling the request and to charge a fee.
136 Byron V. Olsen, The Biotechnology Balancing Act: Patents for Gene
Fragments, and Licensing the "Useful Arts", 7 ALB. L.J. SCl. & TECH. 295, 314~
15 (1997); see alsu Aaron J. z:.ackem, Note, Rethinking Patentable Subject
Matter: Are Statutory Categories Useful?, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2983, 2994~95
(2009) (discussing the misapplication of the definition for algorithm as it applies
to computer software categorizing the area as "unpatenable").
137 Olsen, .~upra note 136, at 321-22.
138 The Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development Annual estimate
places the cost of developing a drug at $2.558 binion. Robert Weisman, Cost of
Bringing Drug to Market Tops $2.5b, Research Finds, Bos. GLOBE (Nov. 18,
2014), http://www.bostonglobe.comlbusiness/2014111118!cost·bringing.
prescrip Lion ·drug -market· tops-billion· tufts· research ·center-estimates!6mPph8
maRxzcvftWjr7HUN!story.html. Forbes puts the cost at $5 billion. Matthew
Herper, The Cost of Creating a New Drug Now $5 Billion, Pushing Big Pharma
to Change. FORBES (Aug. 11, 2013), http://www.forbes.comlsites/matthewherper/
2013/08Jl1Ihow.the-staggering-cost-of-inventing-new-drugs-is-shaping-the·
future-of- medicine!.
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'laws of nature' are obvious, or that their discovery is easy, or that
they are not useful. To the contrary, research into such matters
may be costly and time consuming; ... and that research may
prove of great benefit to the human race. 139

Therefore, to the extent consistent with the Constitution and
the statute, the patent system should attempt to preserve the
incentive to continue to pursue and disclose these discoveries.
An early decision directed solely to determining qualification
as patentable subject matter has the potential to help reduce
overall pendency and cut the cost of examination. Presumably,
some of the determinations will be negative and, if the applicant
respects that determination, the application will be abandoned.
The most difficult and time-consuming aspect of examination is
typically collection and analysis of the prior art.140 Therefore,
applications removed from the queue for lack of patentable
subject matter will be removed more quickly than if the
application had undergone full examination (while applications
which pass the patentable subject matter bar would impose no
additional burden on the system if, as suggested below, that
determination is viewed as binding on subsequent examination).
A rough, unscientific measure of the complexity of prior art
evaluations versus evaluation of statutory subject matter
supports this proposition: the number of pages of the MPEP
devoted to these two tasks. 141 Prior art issues require more than
110 pages,L42 while section 101 issues are covered in four. 143
139 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
140 See Bhaven N. Sampat, W'hen do Applicants Search for Prior Art?, 53 J.L.
& ECON. 399, 399-400 (2010) (noting that since patent examiners face severe
resource constraints when conducting prior art searches, it is important for
applicants to conduct their own prior art searches and then supply information
to ensure the quality of issued patents).
141 The MPEP contains the instructions to the PTO examining corps for
handling all aspects of patent applications. The entire manual is more than
2,800 pages long. The comparative numbers of pages cover the basic
examination only - there are more complicated rules governing reexaminations,
ex parte proceedings, and appeals. However, the proposal for staged
examination would only apply to initial examination, so the comparison covers
the appropriate sections of the MPEP.
142 In the current version of the MPEP, the portion devoted entirely to prior
art and searching takes fifty-five pages. See MPEP ch. 900 (9th ed. Mar. 2014).
The portion of the MPEP devoted to prior art rejections covers sixty-two pages.
See id. § 706.02.
143 See id. § 706.03(a) (covering section 101 rejection in four pages).
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Offering an early decision on patentable subject matter could
also give the PTO an advantage over other national offices in the
competition for international applications under the Patent
Cooperation Treaty.144 Designating the U.S. as the examining
authority would allow an applicant to receive an early
determination as to availability of patent protection in the
world's most important market,145 at a stage when the applicant
still has trade secret protection,L46 This should make the U.s. a
more attractive choice for preliminary examination than another
country's patent office that would not provide this critical
information until after publication of the international
application and consequent loss of trade secret protection. 147
This advantage would be of special importance to two key
industries: computer software (including computer-implemented
business applications and smartphone apps) and biotechnology.148
These are industries with an enormous impact on the U.S.

144 See
id. § 1893 (providing the general guidelines for international
applications and noting that the United States does not have any kind of
expediting process).
145 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.414(a) (2014) (stating that the PTO will act as the
Designated Office for international applications seeking U.S. patent protection).
146 See Susan Perng Pan & Sughrue Mion, Hybrid Use of Trade Secret and
Patent Protection in Green Technology, in 3(4) BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTSSUSTAINABLE ENERGY, at 2 (2010) (explaining that trade secret protection can
still he maintained during the first eight.een months of a patent application's
pendency when first filed in the U.S.).
147 Under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, applications are published
eighteen months after the earliest filing date. See Patent Cooperation Treaty
art. 21(2)(a), June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231, available at
http://www .wipo. intfexport/si tes/www Ipct/erutextsipd£ipct. pdf.
148 It is worth noting that the avalanche of hiotech applications in precisely
the area now under doubt as a result of recent supreme court decisions, was
precipitated by the federal government itself when its National Institute of
Health, to the shock and criticism of many in the fledgling hiotech industry,
filed the first patent applications [or human genes. See, e.g., NIH Gene Patent
Application is Debated at Forum on Human Genome, 44 PAT., THADEMARK &
COPYRICHT J. (BNA) 73, 75 (1992); Leslie Roberts, NIH Gene Patents, Round
Two, 255 SCT. 912, 912-13 (1992); Hilary Stout, U.S. Pursuit of Gene Patents
Riles Industry, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1992, at B1; see also Liz Bowie, NIH is
Hopeful on Gene Patents Despite Rejection Approval is Sought for 2,400
Fragments, BAl.'!'. SUN, Sept. 24, 1992, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1992-0924Ibusinessf1992268051_1_apply -for-patents-o btain·a -pa tent· gene (noting that
the NIH's application for patents on gene fragments "has caused a contentious
debate between the government and academic researchers who are trying to
draw a map of the 50,000 to 100,000 genes in the human body").
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economy.149 These are also industries that typically file patent
applications routed to Art Units with above-average pendency
times,150 precisely because they are important industries with
active research and development programs. 151 They are also
industries directly affected by the Supreme Court's most recent
pronouncements on statutory subject matter.152

C. Legal Justification
Qualification of a claim as statutory subject matter is a legal
issue - whether claims constitute statutory subject matter is a
question of law and is reviewed without deference. 153 This
determination is, therefore, logically separable from substantive
examination, much as the special circumstances exceptions of
MPEP § 707.07(g) or the preliminary completeness review of 35
U.S.C. § 503. 154
Examiners are trained in the technology, and not required to
be lawyers. The determination of statutory subject matter
qualification does not depend on the prior art,155 so no search or
comparison between the prior art and the claimed invention is
necessary. Logically, the examination for statutory subject
matter could be made by a unit staffed by lawyers or paralegals.
Moreover, a number of court cases (apparently ignoring the
PTO's internal guidance regarding compact prosecution) view
statutory subject matter as a "gatekeeper" requirement and
appear to assume that this evaluation takes place prior to
substantive determinations of prior art and enablement
requirements. 156 The courts also appear to believe (again,
149 Bowie, supra note 148.
USPTO REPORT FY 2013, supra note 53, at 190. Thus, even if the PTO
reaches its goal of reducing average pendency below eighteen months, it is
unlikely that the average in these art units will reach that level.
151 Estimates vary widely, but put the cost to bring a new drug to market in
the billions. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
152 See supra note 136 and text accompanying.
153 AT&T Corp. v. Excel Comm'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
154 See discussion supra Part V.A
155 MPEP § 706.02(III) (9th ed. Mar. 2014).
156 See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating that the
first step to accomplish is statutory subject matter determination); State St.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1372 n.2 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (providing that one of the categories of statutory subject matter is
required to pass through to the second door of the process); In re Bergy, 596
F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.PA 1979) ("The first door which must be opened on the
150
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notwithstanding the PTO's internal guidance) that an examiner
who concludes that a claimed invention is not statutory subject
matter will end the inquiry at that point, and will not proceed to
evaluate the sufficiency of enablement or patentability over the
prior art.157
Finally, from the perspective of the constitutional bargain,
section 101 is qualitatively different from the other statutory
sections 1fi8 that may be the basis for rejecting claims to a
patent.159 The section 112 requirements of enablement and
claiming specificity are both within the applicant's controP60 If,
in fact, the applicant has possession of the invention, then the
applicant can satisfy these requirements and examination will
not change thaL161 Section 112 therefore poses no risk to
patentability and hence is not a factor in weighing the risks of
publication. Similarly, the section 102 and 103 requirements that
a patent be issued only for new, non-obvious technology, should
not be a factor in weighing the risks of publication. These
sections only come into play if there is already publicly available
information describing the claimed invention 1o:': or rendering it
obvious. 163 If such information is already publicly available (even
if not known to the applicant), then by definition there is no
trade secret to protect. 164

difficult path to patentability is § 101.").
lfi7 See State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1372 (noting that section 101 is a
threshold issue that must be addressed before other questions of patentability).
158 See Bergy, 596 F.2d at 960 (explaining how section 101 is "distinguished
from the qualitative conditions which make the invention patentable").
159 Id.
160 See 35 U.S.C. § ] 12 (2012) (requiring an inventor to provide a detailed
specification "in such full, dear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains ... to make and use the same").
161 If, however, the applicant cannot describe the invention or teach those of
ordinary skill how to make and use the invention, then the applicant has
nothing to protect and loses nothing by disclosure.
162 Id. § 102.
16;{ Id. § 103.
164 A trade secret is defined as "information ... that: (i) derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not
being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that
are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy." Unif. Trade
Secrets Act § 1(4) (amended 1985). Thus, for at least three reasons there can be
no trade secret. Definitionally, a trade secret must be information that the
applicant's competitors do not know. ld. If publicly available, competitors can
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A section 101 rejection is different - it does not deny patent
protection because the public already has the technology or
because the applicant refuses to disclose it fully.165 Rather it
denies protection solely because the technology is not within a
protectable category. 166 This difference matters, because it means
that the applicant could maintain the technology as a trade
secret rather than seek a patent. Thus, it is the only category of
substantive rejection that would logically come into play in an
applicant's decision whether to maintain trade secret protection
or forfeit it in hopes of obtaining a patent.
1.

Unworkable Solutions

Two options under the existing system might suggest
themselves as solutions: opting out of pre-grant publication167
and requesting expedited processing of the application.l68
Current rules allow an applicant to affirmatively opt out of the
pre-grant publication program. lil!) In order to do so, the applicant
must represent that the application will not be filed in any
country that publishes applications before the grant of a patent,
including under the Patent Cooperation Treaty.170 While this
solution technically avoids the dilemma presented by the need to
decide whether to surrender a trade secret in the absence of
critical information, it exacts a significant price. In effect, it
merely transfers the dilemma from "surrender trade secret or
not" to "surrender international protection or not."
Current rules also allow an applicant to request expedited
examination under certain conditions, and upon payment of an

gain access through proper means, negating trade secret status. Id. Finally, if
publicly available, there is no way the applicant can take reasonable steps to
protect it. ld.
165 See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (explaining that
sections 102 and 103 "guardD the public interest by assuring that patents are
not granted which would take from the public that which it already enjoys
(matters already within its knowledge whether in actual use or not) or
Potentially enjoys by reason of obviousness from knowledge which it already
has").
166 See id. (noting three protected categories under section 101; novelty,
utility, and statutory subject matter).
167 37 C.F.R. § 1.213(a) (2014).
168 Id. § 1.102(a).
169 Id. § 1.213(a).
170 Id. § 1.213(a)(3).
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extra fee. l7l The scope of expedited examination does not differ
from the scope of regular examination - the application is simply
placed in a separate queue, ahead of those in the regular
examination queue (but behind other expedited applications).172
There is therefore no guarantee that the examination will take
place early enough to beat the eighteen-month publication
date. 173 Use of the expedited system also does nothing to deal
with the fundamental problem of pendency - the average
pendency will remain the same, it is just that different
applications will be examined first.174 On the other hand, staged
application offers the possibility of reducing average pendency
because of the possibility that applications will be disposed of at
the preliminary stage, using fewer office resources (because of
the elimination of the need to conduct prior art searches and
evaluations).
2.

A Workable System

While the motivation for compact prosecution was laudable,
subsequent events have turned its advantages into
disadvantages in many important situations. At a minimum,
applicants should have the option to request that certain issues
be examined before a full review on the merits. The issue of
statutory subject matter is the issue that currently logically fits
and demands attention, but other issues may be appropriate in
the future and consideration should be given to an applicant's
option to request preliminary determination of any nontechnological issue of patentability.
Because the issue is purely legal, it would make sense for the
PTO to establish a unit, staffed by legally trained personnel, to
make the determinations. Setting up such a unit, rather than
having the decisions made within the various art units, would
also have the advantage of developing a more coherent body of
precedent and should lead to more predictable results. This
would further the main objective of the system by giving
inventors early information regarding patentability prospects so
as to encourage disclosure in those areas Congress has chosen to
incentivize, and would also give the patent bar a tool for
Jd. § l.102(a), (e).
172Id.
173 35 U.S.C. § 122(h)(1) (Supp. 2013).
174 37 C.F.R. § l.102(a).
171

2015]

RETHINKING COMPACT PROSECUTION

287

providing reliable advice.
The decision on qualification as statutory subject matter must
be made quickly - no later than 16.5 months after filing,175 but
ideally much earlier. The decision must be binding on the PTO
during examination. Amended claims, of course, could not receive
this preliminary evaluation because they were not part of the
original filing and therefore the PTO would not have made a
determination regarding those claims. It would be desirable that
amended claims receive statutory subject matter evaluation that
is consistent with the evaluation of originally filed claims, but the
applicant controls the drafting of claims so it would not be unfair
to limit the binding effect to originally filed claims only.
The decision should be reviewable, either by interlocutory
appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals or by petition to the
Director. Not only would the availability of an immediate appeal
be of value to the applicant, but it would also provide the PTO
with a vehicle for monitoring the issue and developing a coherent
and consistent policy in the face of uncertain and evolving
guidance from the courts.
While early determination seems to benefit both the applicant
and the PTO, the applicant might be charged a fee for requesting
a preliminary determination of a non-technological issue. To
protect against unforeseen misuse of the system, a petition could
be required, with the presumption that such petitions would
ordinarily be granted absent special circumstances. 176
Such a system would, of course, require personnel, but if it in
fact results in the early abandonment of applications prior to
substantive examination, it should in the long run reduce the
need for additional personnel or reduce the burden on existing
personneL It should fit neatly within the agency's existing
structure and would likely be revenue neutral or positive. In the
event that the system did impose additional costs, they could be
recovered by user fees. If properly set, the fees should be
acceptable to the inventor community as a reasonable cost of
critical information, along with the option of avoiding additional
175 See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the calculation of
this timeframe).
176 A similar system is already in place for reviving unintentionally
abandoned applications. 37 C.F.R § 1.137 (2014). Technically, a petition to
revive (and filing fee) must be filed, and the Director has the authority to deny
the petition or require additional information, but if the petition is filed
promptly the presumption is that it will be granted. ld.
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prosecution costs in the event of an adverse decision.
Such a system would separate out a comparatively easy issue,
one that does not require a time·consuming search of prior art or
any technological comparison with the prior art. It would have
the potential of saving the PTO resources by weeding out some
applications at a preliminary stage, before there is a need (as
required under compact prosecution) to develop a response on
complex technological issues that would be moot in light of the
essentially legal issue of statutory subject matter. The PTO could
also use the opportunity to build a specialized group with
expertise in resolving this recurrent issue quickly and efficiently.
Applicants would likewise save money if convinced of the lack of
statutory subject matter at an early stage. Of greatest
importance, an early response on this issue gives the applicant
valuable information in time to make an informed choice between
trade secret protection and patent protection.
The Supreme Court has noted that the patent laws are not
"primarily designed to provide a special private benefit" to
inventors.177 The Court has also acknowledged, though, that the
patent laws are "intended to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors ... and to allow the public access to the
products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive
control has expired."178 Assuring inventors that their innovations
will not be taken from them unfairly is a big step toward
motivating creativity and, more importantly, disclosure, which is
the ultimate goal of the Patent Statute.

177 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984).
178 Jd.

